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Real Property
by Linda S. Finley *
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article surveys developments in Georgia real property law
between June 1, 2019, and May 31, 2020. 1 Of course, the Survey became
significantly different from previous years as a result of the COVID-19
pandemic. The Supreme Court of Georgia issued emergency rules and
procedures resulting in the shutdown of many courts and most assuredly
the slowdown of every court. Nevertheless, the Survey is the result of a
review of appellate court decisions rendered during the survey period as
well as legislation and other mandates promulgated during the period
which affects real property law and practice.
II. LEGISLATION
The Georgia General Assembly convened its first session on January
13, 2020. Little did anyone know that on March 14, 2020, the Legislature
would be forced to suspend its sessions and otherwise limit legislative
activity for twelve weeks due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The
Legislature did not reconvene until June 16, 2020, and completed its
session on June 26, 2020. 2
On March 14, 2020, Georgia Governor Brian Kemp issued an
Executive Order declaring a Public Health State of Emergency in
Georgia. 3 The pandemic created the necessity for virtual meetings,
working remotely, and even virtual real estate closings. Prior to the
* Shareholder, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC. Mercer
University (B.A., 1978); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 1981). Member, State Bar
of Georgia and Florida; United States District Courts for the Northern District of Georgia,
Middle District of Georgia, Southern District of Georgia, Northern District of Florida and
Middle District of Florida, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit;
Supreme Court of the United States; The author wishes to give special thanks to Beatrice
“Teta” Bacilieri for handling the many administrative tasks necessary to bring this survey
article to print.
1 For an analysis of real property law during the prior survey period, see Linda S. Finley,
Real Property, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 71 MERCER L. REV. 241 (2019).
2 State Bar of Georgia (2020) Legislative Update, Day 29-40 (2020).
3 State of Georgia Executive Order No. 03.14.20.01 (2020).
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shuttering of most businesses, including law firms, Georgia law required
“in person” 4 notarization. 5 Although House Bill 785 6 established a
protocol for remote online notarization, the bill did not pass out of
legislative committee. COVID-19 changed that. On March 31, 2020,
Governor Kemp issued an Executive Order pertaining to execution of
documents, suspending the requirement under Georgia law that formal
witnessing of documents used in real estate transactions (including that
of a notary) must be executed in person. 7 The Executive Order
temporarily allows attestation of recordable instruments, that under
statute must be executed in the physical presence of a notary to allow the
executor to be in one location, and a witness, and the notary in another
location through the use of real-time audio video communication that
“allows [all] parties to communicate simultaneously with each other by
sight and sound.” 8 Later, as it became apparent that the pandemic was
going to last longer than expected, the Governor extended the Public
Health State of Emergency 9 and issued an Executive Order “Allowing
Remote Notarization and Attestation,” which expanded the prior order
allowing attestation outside the presence of a notary and/or witness to
other legal documents and sets out five requirements for proper virtual
notarization. 10 Specifically, this Executive Order requires: (1) That the
audio-video communication technology allows simultaneous (real-time)
communication among the individual signing the document (the signer),
the witness(es) and/or the notary public by sight and sound; (2) that the
notary is either a Georgia licensed attorney or operating under the
supervision of a Georgia attorney; (3) that the signer presents evidence
of identity during the live session; (4) that the notary is physically located
in the state of Georgia; and (5) that the signer transmits a copy of the
signed document to the notary on the same date it was executed, and that
the notary, and witness execute the document on the same day that the
signer executes the document. 11

O.C.G.A. § 44-2-1 (2020).
O.C.G.A. § 45-17-1 (2020).
6 Ga. H.R. Bill 785, Reg. Sess. (2020); Thrash, Mo, Legislative Newsletter, Mortgage
Bankers Association of Georgia, June 30, 2020.
7 State of Georgia Executive Order No. 03.31.20.01 (2020).
8 Id.
9 State of Georgia Executive Order No. 04.08.20.02 (2020).
10 State of Georgia Executive Order No. 04.09.20.01 (2020).
11 Id., See also https://www.gabar.org/COVID-19_remote_notarization.cfm.
4
5
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III. CONDEMNATION AND EMINENT DOMAIN 12
In Torres v. City of Jonesboro, 13 the Georgia Court of Appeals
considered whether the trial court erred in holding that the appellants
(Torres) failed to prove the amount of attorney’s fees they incurred in
defending a condemnation action they alleged was abandoned by the City
of Jonesboro (City). 14 Through two condemnation actions, the City took
Torres’s property. Torres fought the fact of the taking and the City
voluntarily dismissed the cases. 15 Consequently, citing O.C.G.A.
§ 22-1-12(2), 16 Torres moved for attorney’s fees and costs. 17 Torres’s
counsel attached affidavits and billing records; court reporter bills; and
bills and affidavits of an appraiser to the motion for fees and costs.
Torres’s fee expert testified that the attorney’s fees, appraisal fees, and
costs, which totaled $51,206.15, were reasonable. During the City’s
cross-examination, Torres’s expert testified the basis for his testimony
consisted of a review of the billing statements and affidavits. When
testimony concluded, the City moved to strike the expert’s testimony
claiming it was hearsay. The trial court agreed and denied Torres’s
attorney’s fees motion by finding that without the expert’s testimony,
Torres failed to present evidence as to the amount of fees. 18
On appeal, the court of appeals held that the City’s motion to strike
the expert testimony was not a proper objection to the hearsay because
it was only raised after Torres had rested. 19 The court held that “[a] noncontemporaneous motion to strike is not ‘a procedural tool to object to
evidence, except in those limited instances where the evidence was
inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of a criminal
defendant’s constitutional rights.’” 20 The court vacated the judgment and
remanded the case back to the trial court. 21

12 This section was co-authored by Ivy N. Cadle and Lauren D. Brooks. Mr. Cadle is a
shareholder in the law office of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C.,
Macon, Georgia and an Adjunct Professor of Law at Mercer University School of Law.
Mercer University School of Law (J.D. 2007); University of Georgia (MAcc. 2002);
University of Georgia (B.S. 2000); CPA, 2008. Mrs. Brooks is an associate in the law office
of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., Tallahassee, Florida.; Levin
College of Law, University of Florida (J.D. 2013), Clemson University, (B.S. 2004).
13 354 Ga. App. 874, 842 S.E.2d 75 (2020).
14 Id. at 874–75, 842 S.E.2d at 76.
15 Id. at 875, 842 S.E.2d at 76.
16 O.C.G.A. § 22-1-12(2) (2020).
17 Torres, 354 Ga. App. at 875, 842 S.E.2d at 76.
18 Id. at 875–76, 842 S.E.2d at 76–77.
19 Id. at 876–77, 842 S.E.2d at 77.
20 Id.
21 Id.

258

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

In Department of Transportation v. Szenczi, 22 the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that an O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(b) 23 motion attacking service of
process must be filed in conjunction with a notice of appeal. 24 Appellee
and Condemnee Szenczi challenged service under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-8(b) 25
and argued The Department of Transportation (DOT) should effectuate
service of process on the probate court or guardian because Szenczi
claimed a disability. 26
On December 9, 2013, DOT filed a petition for condemnation of real
property for 0.674 acres of property, including that of Szenczi, and paid
$30,150 as its estimate of just and adequate compensation into the
registry of the trial court. Per the sheriff’s return of service, a deputy
sheriff personally served Szenczi with the petition on December 16, 2013.
Four months later, the trial court entered a judgment finding no
condemnee appealed DOT’s estimate of compensation within the
required thirty-day period. 27
On April 23, 2014, an attorney representing Szenczi filed a notice of
appeal contesting the amount of compensation paid by DOT. On May 22,
2014, Szenczi’s son, claiming to be his father’s “attorney-in-fact” and
represented by his father’s attorney, also filed a notice of appeal. 28
Months later, on September 5, 2014, Szenczi filed a motion to set aside
the final order under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(d), 29 arguing that DOT’s
negotiations with Szenczi’s son made them aware Szenczi was disabled
and being represented by his son. 30 Because of that knowledge, Szenczi
argued that DOT should have served Szenczi and his son. 31 In its defense,
DOT offered an affidavit from the deputy who served Szenczi, stating
that Szenczi, “identified himself . . . and was able to communicate in an
appropriately responsive manner. [Other than] being in a wheelchair,
Mr. [Szenczi] did not appear to me to be laboring under any disability.” 32
After two hearings on the matter, the trial court cited the deputy’s
observation of Szenczi in a wheelchair and found “Szenczi was laboring
under ‘any disability whatsoever’ [per] O.C.G.A. § 32-3-8(b) and, thus, the

354 Ga. App. 855, 841 S.E.2d 228 (2020).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(b) (2020).
24 Szenczi, 354 Ga. App. at 858, 841 S.E.2d at 231.
25 O.C.G.A. § 32-3-8(b) (2020).
26 Szenczi, 354 Ga. App. at 855, 841 S.E.2d at 229.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 856, 841 S.E.2d at 229–30.
29 O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(d) (2020).
30 Szenczi, 354 Ga. App. at 856, 841 S.E.2d at 230.
31 Id.
32 Id.
22
23
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DOT was required to have served the probate court of the county in
addition to serving Szenczi personally.” 33
On appeal, the court opined that a defense of insufficiency of process
or insufficiency of service of process is waived if it is not made by motion
or included in a responsive pleading, and Szenczi’s notice of appeal failed
to plead defective service or mention service at all. 34 The court further
explained that because Szenczi failed to plead improper service in the
notice of appeal and he did not file his O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(b) motion with
his untimely notice of appeal (instead, he filed the motion three months
later), Szenczi waived the issue of improper service. 35 The court reversed
the judgment setting aside the final order. 36
In Troup County v. Mako Development, 37 the Georgia Court of
Appeals addressed three key issues: (1) Did the trial court erroneously
instruct the jury on consequential damages? (2) Did the trial court
improperly allow the jury to hear evidence of a “runway protection zone?”
(3) Did the trial court properly refuse to award attorney fees sought by
Mako? 38
Before Troup County (County) sought to expand its airport, Mako
owned a 4.41-acre tract near the end of a runway. In August of 2015, the
County sought to extend that runway towards Mako’s property. To
facilitate the runway extension, the County took an avigation easement
over the entire 4.41 acre property so airplanes could fly low over Mako’s
property to land on the extended runway. Claiming the area protected by
the avigation easement was from 725 to 740 feet, the County sought to
pay $4,500. However, after the taking, the County entered Mako’s
property to remove twenty-two trees the County claimed encroached on
the airspace protected by the avigation easement. 39
Mako timely filed a notice of appeal of the declaration and petition of
taking, invoking its right to a jury trial to determine the amount of just
and adequate compensation. At trial, both parties hired expert
appraisers to testify on the appropriate amount of compensation for the
condemned property. The County’s appraiser valued the property at
$149,738 before the condemnation and $145,246 after the condemnation,
attributing the $4,492 reduction in value to the direct taking of the
avigation easement. The County’s appraiser testified there were no
consequential damages to the remainder of the property. Mako’s
Id.
Id. at 857, 841 S.E.2d at 231.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 352 Ga. App. 366, 835 S.E.2d 44 (2019), cert. denied (June 1, 2020).
38 Id. at 366, 835 S.E.2d at 46.
39 Id. at 366, 835 S.E.2d 46–47.
33
34
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appraiser testified the property was worth $1,102,500 before the
condemnation and $705,600 afterward, for a total reduction in value of
$396,900. Mako’s appraiser attributed $220,500 of that loss to the direct
taking of the easement and the remaining $176,400 as consequential
damages to the remainder of the property. 40
“Over the County’s objection, the trial court instructed the jury to
consider both direct and consequential damages.” 41 Direct damages were
defined by the trial court as damage “‘to the property actually taken,’
meaning ‘the actual value of the loss.’” 42 The trial court then
defined consequential damages as damage to, “the property the owner
has left after the part the Condemnor takes or uses is subtracted,”
meaning “the difference between the value of the remaining property
immediately before the taking and its value after the taking” or “the
decrease, if any, in the fair market value of this remainder in its
circumstance just prior to the time of the taking compared with its fair
market value in its new circumstances just after the time of the
taking.” 43

The County claimed Mako’s appraiser was in error because he should
have only valued the easement taken instead of valuing the easement
taken and assigning a consequential damage to the property below. 44
However, the court held that the jury instruction was harmless because
the facts and circumstances surrounding the verdict indicated there was
no double recovery. 45
Second, the County argued that evidence of a runway protection zone
was irrelevant and improperly confused the jury. 46 In response, the court
explained a jury is allowed to consider all elements reasonably affecting
value and the runway protection zone, set forth in compliance with local
ordinances and Federal Aviation Administration regulations, restricted
the uses of certain parts of the property. 47 Specifically, no hazardous
materials could be stored and no facilities where people would gather
could be constructed within 1,700 feet of the end of a runway. 48 Because
of the extended runway, the protection zone encroached into Mako’s
property after the taking. 49 Because this incursion plainly limited
Id. at 367–68, 835 S.E.2d 47.
Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 371, 835 S.E.2d at 49.
45 Id. at 372, 835 S.E.2d at 49–50.
46 Id., 835 S.E.2d at 50.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 373, 835 S.E.2d at 50.
49 Id.
40
41
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potential uses of Mako’s property, the court held evidence of the existence
of the runway protection zone was relevant and admissible and did not
unfairly confuse the jury as to what they were supposed to be
evaluating. 50
Finally, as it concerned Mako’s claim for attorney’s fees pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14, 51 the court held the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by refusing to award attorney’s fees based on Mako’s claim the
County’s appraisal was fundamentally flawed. 52 Instead, the court noted
the four alleged flaws in the County’s appraisal and reviewed the
conflicting evidence the County presented to support its appraisal. 53
Explaining that “even if the County’s appraisal resulted in a rather
lowball amount, there was at least some factual evidence to support” the
County’s position on each of the points. 54 Accordingly, the court held the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mako’s claim for
attorney’s fees and affirmed the final judgment. 55
IV. EASEMENTS, COVENANTS AND BOUNDARIES 56
Easements and declarations of covenants can be affirmative or
negative. Both are methods of granting certain rights in connection with
the property while retaining title to the land. However, easements are
usually affirmative, giving the holder the right to use someone else’s land
for a specified purpose. Alternatively, covenants are usually negative,
limiting what the burdened party can do on their own land. On the other
hand, boundary line disputes arise if there is some question as to the
legal boundaries of the property.
Sorrow v. 380 Properties, LLC, 57 concerns creation and abandonment
of easements. The evidence showed that Sorrow lived on the south side
of an alley that was adjacent to property she had owned since 1990. 380
Properties (Plaintiff) purchased property on the north side of the alley in
2013. Plaintiff brought suit against Sorrow after she refused to remove a
make-shift garage, rocks, trees, and shrubs that blocked the alleyway to
the street. Sorrow counterclaimed alleging that Plaintiff had abandoned
Id. at 373, 835 S.E.2d at 50–51.
O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 (2020).
52 Troup County, 352 Ga. App. at 374, 835 S.E.2d at 51.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 375, 835 S.E.2d at 52.
55 Id. at 376, 835 S.E.2d at 52.
56 This section was authored by Linda Finley and Tanisha Pinkins, Associate, Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC. Buffalo State College (B.A., 2010; B.S.,
2010); Emory University School of Law (J.D., 2016). Member, State Bar of Georgia,
Supreme Court of Georgia, United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia.
57 354 Ga. App. 118, 840 S.E2d 470 (2020).
50
51
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its easement rights to one portion of the alley and that she had obtained
a prescriptive easement regarding a second portion. 58
The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Plaintiff, finding
that there was no authority for Sorrow’s claim of partial abandonment
and that her evidence of non-use was insufficient. 59 The court denied the
parties’ other cross motions for summary judgment on the Plaintiff’s
affirmative defense that Sorrow was not entitled to relief under an
“unclean hands” theory. 60 Sorrow appealed and Plaintiff filed a
cross-appeal on the denial of its own motions. 61
On appeal, Sorrow argued that the trial court erred in concluding that
Plaintiff had not partially abandoned the alleyway. 62 The appellate court
found no authority for the proposition that an express easement could be
partially abandoned and declined to extend case law recognizing that “a
partial tract may be acquired by prescription.” 63 The court once and for
all held that “Georgia law does not recognize partial abandonment of an
express easement.” 64
Sorrow further contended that the trial court erred in finding that she
had failed to present sufficient evidence to prove Plaintiff’s abandonment
of the alleyway. She argued that Tietjen v. Meldrim 65 established a threeprong test which she met by showing that: (1) the alley had been
obstructed for more than thirty years by present and previous owners;
(2) that Plaintiff had not used a portion of the alley at all; and (3) use of
a second portion of the alley was exclusive to her property. 66 However,
the appellate court did not read Tietjen as establishing such a test and
the law on point was that where the easement was established by grant,
the doctrine of extinction by a non-use did not apply. 67 “‘[M]ere nonuser
without further evidence of an intent to abandon such easement will not
constitute abandonment.’” 68
Citing Tietjen, the appellate court held that Sorrow’s burden was to
prove an intent to abandon by “clear and unequivocal” evidence and
further that no presumption of abandonment would arise from mere
non-use for a period less than that required to acquire easement by
Id. at 119, 840 S.E.2d at 471.
Id. at 119, 840 S.E.2d at 472.
60 Id. at 119–20, 840 S.E.2d at 472.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 121, 840 S.E.2d at 472.
63 Id.
64 Id., 840 S.E.2d at 472–73.
65 169 Ga. 678, 151 S.E.2d 349 (1930).
66 Sorrow, 354 Ga. App. at 121, 151 S.E.2d at 473.
67 Id.
68 Id. (citing Sadler v. First Nat. Bank of Baldwin County, 267 Ga. 122, 475 S.E.2d 643
(1996)).
58
59
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prescription. 69 The language in Tietjen cited by the court repeats several
times that there must be a clear intent to abandon—the evidence of
non-use must be decisive and unequivocal and the intent to abandon
must be of a clear, unequivocal, and decisive character. 70 Because Sorrow
failed to introduce evidence that Plaintiff either expressly abandoned its
easement in the alley or prove more than non-use by Plaintiff, evidence
was insufficient to show an intent to abandon. 71
Sorrow also argued that the trial court erred in denying her motion for
summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s affirmative defense that
she was not entitled to equitable relief because of her “unclean hands.” 72
Sorrow brought claims in equity against Plaintiff for easement
abandonment, adverse possession, and prescriptive easement. The
long-held maxim in bringing and defending actions in equity is that “[h]e
who would have equity must do equity” and Plaintiff’s affirmative
defense was based on allegations that Sorrow violated zoning and
permitting ordinances with the erection of the make-shift garage and
showed a continuing pattern of other illegal behavior. 73 The court held
that the nature of Sorrow’s behavior and actions was a question of fact
and therefore she was not entitled to summary judgment. 74 Likewise,
Plaintiff’s crossclaim for summary judgment on the unclean hands theory
failed for the same reason, and the claim that Plaintiff was entitled to
judgment on Sorrow’s prescriptive easement claim failed because a
question of fact was created when she testified that she repaired and
maintained the alley. 75
In Patel Taherbhai, Inc. v. Broad Street Stockbridge II, LLC, 76 the
court of appeals held that proper action by which the owner of dominant
land could seek to remove obstructions on an access easement was an
action for damages or injunctive relief, not ejectment. 77 This decision
overruled Amah v. Whitefield Academy, Inc. 78
Broad Street, the owner of land benefited by an access easement,
brought suit for ejectment and injunctive relief against Patel Taherbhai
(Patel), the owner of the servient land. The suit claimed that Patel
constructed certain encroachments on an access easement granted to

Id.
Id. at 121–22, 840 S.E.2d 473.
71 Id. at 122–23, 840 S.E.2d at 473–74.
72 Id. at 123, 840 S.E.2d at 474.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 124, 840 S.E.2d at 474.
76 352 Ga. App. 113, 834 S.E.2d 117 (2019).
77 Id. at 123, 834 S.E.2d at 121.
78 331 Ga. App. 258, 770 S.E.650 (2015).
69
70
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Broad Street and that the encroachments were unsafe and diminished
the value of Broad Street’s property. 79
In 2001, predecessors in interest of the parties entered into a
Reciprocal Easement Agreement (REA) which granted Broad Street’s
predecessor “[a] perpetual, non-exclusive and unobstructed access,
ingress, and egress easement over, across, upon and through those
portions of [what became Patel’s] property ‘(the Access Easement).’” 80
In 2007, Patel purchased the property (the dominant estate) and built
a Taco Bell thereon. In order to make room for a drive-through line, a
four-way intersection situated on the Access Easement was altered and
Patel also extended the Taco Bell parking spots into the Access
Easement. Two years after the Taco Bell was constructed, Broad Street
purchased its tract of land (the servient estate). Five years after its
purchase, Broad Street reached out to Patel complaining about the
parking lot and intersection. After the parties were unable to resolve
their dispute, Broad Street filed suit claiming that Patel’s
“encroachment” created a safety hazard, violated the clear terms of the
Access Easement, and diminished the value of Broad Street’s property.
Broad Street sought an injunction ordering Patel to remove the
encroachments and ejectment on the ground that Patel was wrongfully
attempting to exercise possession and control of Broad Street’s
property. 81
Patel moved for summary judgment and to dismiss the Complaint on
the grounds that there was no evidence that the modifications to the
Access Easement substantially or materially interfered with Broad
Street’s easement, that Broad Street had enjoyed uninterrupted access
to its property, and that Broad Street did not timely object to the
encroachment, therefore, Broad Street was equitably estopped from then
objecting to the encroachment. Patel further argued that Broad Street’s
complaint was time-barred because actions for trespass upon or damage
to property must be brought within four years after the right to the cause
of action accrues. 82 Along that same line of argument, Patel argued that
Broad Street was guilty of laches and was barred from seeking equitable
relief because it allowed the modification to remain in place for more than
seven years before filing the complaint. 83
The appellate court reviewed the characteristics of easements and the
law of ejectment and determined it was error for the trial court to order

Id. at 113, 834 S.E.2d at 118.
Id. at 114, 834 S.E.2d at 119.
81 Id. at 114–15, 834 S.E.2d at 119.
82 Id. at 115, 834 S.E.2d at 119–120.
83 Id., 834 S.E.2d at 120.
79
80
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ejectment. 84 The trial court relied upon the earlier Amah case to conclude
that, in cases of encroachment upon an easement, the remedy of
ejectment was proper. 85 In overruling Amah, the appellate court held
that the proper remedy for encroachment upon an easement is a suit for
damages, not ejectment. 86
Moreover, the court of appeals, relying on the early precedent of
Ezzard v. Findley Gold Mining Co., 87 restated “that an action for
ejectment only lies for something tangible, something of which possession
may be delivered by the sheriff to the plaintiff.” 88 “Where a party’s
enjoyment of its easement is disrupted or obstructed, the remedy is an
action for damages or injunction.” 89 There was no evidence that Broad
Street’s ownership and use of the property was diminished. 90 Therefore,
it was error for the trial court to order ejectment and the trial court was
reversed. 91
Turning to covenants in Polo Golf and Country Club Homeowners
Association, Inc. v. Cunard et al, 92 the Georgia Supreme Court held that
an ordinance does not violate the Contracts Clause of the U.S.
Constitution 93 or the Georgia Constitution’s Impairment Clause 94 if it
does not preclude a homeowner’s association from exercising the
contractual remedies of its declaration of covenants. 95
The Polo Golf and Country Club Homeowners Association (the HOA)
brought an action against Forsyth County engineering department
executives in their individual capacities (the executives), seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief regarding enforcement of an addendum
to the county’s stormwater ordinance. The executives brought dispositive
motions which the trial court granted and the HOA appealed. 96
The issues arise from flooding of a Forsyth County subdivision (the
Polo Fields) caused by failure of stormwater mechanisms including a
dam. The HOA’s position was that the county was responsible for repair
and upkeep of the failing storm water mechanism, but the county relied
Id. at 116, 834 S.E.2d at 120.
Id. at 117, 834 S.E.2d at 120.
86 Id. at 118, 834 S.E.2d at 121–22.
87 74 Ga. 520, 58 Am. Rep. 445 (1885).
88 Patel, 352 Ga. App. at 119, 834 S.E.2d at 122.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 306 Ga. 788, 793, 833 S.E.2d 505, 509 (2019).
93 U.S. CONST. art. 1, §10.
94 GA CONST. of 1983, art. I, sec. 1, par. X.
95 Polo Golf and Country Club Home Owners Association, 306 Ga. at 793, 833 S.E.2d at
509.
96 Id. at 788–89, 833 S.E.2d at 507.
84
85
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upon a 2014 version of the Georgia Stormwater Management Design
Manual (the Stormwater Manual) providing that “‘[w]hen a
subdivision . . . whether new or existing, has legally created a property
or homeowner’s association, [such as the HOA here], the [homeowner’s]
association will be responsible for maintenance of all drainage easement
and stormwater facilities.’” 97 In response, the HOA argued that the 2014
version of the Stormwater Manual was unconstitutional because it
impaired the HOA’s contractual obligations to its homeowners as set out
in the subdivision’s Declaration of Covenants which made each
homeowner responsible for such repair. The trial court found in favor of
the executives that the HOA’s contract-based constitutional claims were
not viable and also concluded that the executives were protected from
suit under sovereign immunity. 98 The appellate court, however,
determined that the trial court’s analysis was backwards because the
trial court looked first at the issue of constitutionality and then at
sovereign immunity. 99 Sovereign immunity should have been the
threshold analysis before the court moved on to an analysis of the
constitutional issue. 100 Furthermore, the trial court’s finding that suit
against the executives was barred by sovereign immunity was in error as
“the doctrine of sovereign immunity usually poses no bar to suits [for
prospective relief] in which state officers are sued in their individual
capacities for official acts that are alleged to be unconstitutional.” 101
Because the HOA sued the executives from the basis of prospective relief,
the suit was not barred by sovereign immunity. 102 However, how the trial
court reached its decision had no effect to the outcome because, as the
executives argued, the HOA had no standing to bring the suit because
the executives did not take enforcement action against the HOA. 103
Without action to enforce the stormwater regulations, the HOA could not
show that injury was “actual and imminent” as required for the relief it
sought. 104
The court found that the trial court’s grant of judgment on the
pleadings to the executives was proper based on the evidence which
showed that the county ordinance did not wholly preclude the HOA from
using the provisions of the declaration to affect compliance by the
subdivisions’ homeowners to comply with the county’s stormwater
Id. at 790, 833 S.E.2d at 507 (emphasis omitted).
Id., 833 S.E.2d at 508.
99 Id. at 790–91, 833 S.E.2d at 508.
100 Id. at 791, 833 S.E.2d at 508.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
97
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maintenance requirements. 105 The HOA identified only impediments to
its exercise of its contractual remedies, such as the vagaries of dealing
with time constraints; the bureaucracy of its administrative board; and
difficult homeowners, but it did not show any actual inability to exercise
its contractual remedies on account of the ordinance. 106 Accordingly, the
court held that there was no violation of the protections of the U.S.
Constitution’s Contracts Clause. 107
The HOA also failed to show that the ordinance impaired the HOA
Declarations so as to violate the Georgia Constitution’s Impairment
Clause. 108 The test is whether a vested right exists and then whether that
vested right has been “injuriously affected” by the law in question. 109 The
HOA contended that the rights set forth in the Declaration were vested
rights but it failed to fully articulate a vested right or show that the
ordinance affected any alleged vested right or caused injury to the
HOA. 110 The Georgia Supreme Court held that the ordinance did not
prohibit the HOA from exercising all of its remedies for addressing
homeowners’ noncompliance with their stormwater maintenance
obligations under the Declaration. 111 The trial court’s decision to grant
the stormwater executives’ motion for judgment on the pleadings was
affirmed. 112
V. Foreclosure 113
The Georgia courts addressed Georgia non-judicial foreclosure
practices and procedures in a few notable decisions during the Survey
period.
First, the Georgia Court of Appeals revisited the requirement that a
foreclosure sale be judicially confirmed prior to an attempt to collect a
loan deficiency. In Wells v. Regions Bank, 114 a borrower appealed the trial
court decision granting summary judgment in favor of the lender on a
breach of contract suit for money owed on a home equity line of credit
Id. at 792–93, 833 S.E.2d at 509.
89 Id. at 793, 833 S.E.2d at 509.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 794, 833 S.E.2d at 510.
109 Id. at 793–94, 833 S.E.2d 510.
110 Id. at 794, 833 S.E.2d 510.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 This section was authored by Dylan W. Howard, Shareholder, Baker, Donelson,
Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC. Yale University (B.A., cum laude, 1999); University
of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2002). Member, State Bar of Georgia, Supreme
Court of Georgia, Georgia Court of Appeals, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, United States District Courts for the Northern District of Georgia, Middle District
of Georgia and Southern Districts of Georgia.
114 350 Ga. App. 652, 829 S.E.2d 889 (2019).
105
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following the foreclosure of a prior construction loan held by the same
lender. 115 The court of appeals ultimately overturned the decision,
finding that the borrower had raised genuine issues of material fact
precluding judgment to the lender. 116 The court noted at the outset that
the judicial confirmation requirement applies where there are two
separate debts at issue: (1) where said debts are inextricably intertwined
and (2) where both loans were secured by the same property and involved
the same parties. 117 Regions argued that the confirmation requirement
should not apply because the stated purpose for the line of credit was for
“personal expenses.” 118 Prior cases turned in part on the ‘purpose’ of the
loans and the trial court granted summary judgment in Regions’ favor on
the basis of the stated ‘purpose’ of the loan at issue. 119 The court of
appeals determined that the trial court’s review was too technical stating
that “[w]e are not persuaded by Regions’s argument that the ‘purpose’
was not the same as the ‘use.’” 120 Since the borrowers had actually used
a portion of the proceeds of the home equity line of credit to repair and
improve the home, the court held that the loans were sufficiently related
to raise a genuine issue of material fact requiring a jury. 121 This decision
clearly limits lenders’ ability to draft their contracts in order to avoid the
Georgia confirmation requirement.
In Oconee Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Brown, 122 the
Georgia Court of Appeals addressed a host of issues raised by borrowers
attempting to contest a foreclosure. First, the court definitively held that
a party facing foreclosure is not entitled to a declaratory judgment
because while they may have other justiciable claims, they are not in
need of any direction from the trial court with respect to future conduct
on their part. 123 The court also overturned the trial court’s decision to
deny summary judgment on the borrower’s anticipatory repudiation
claim. 124 The borrowers alleged that Oconee Federal anticipatorily
repudiated its contractual obligations by allegedly rejecting their
attempts to tender payment, by instructing them not to make payments,
and by demanding that the borrowers sign away certain rights. 125 The

Id. at 652, 829 S.E.2d at 890.
Id.
117 Id. at 655, 829 S.E.2d at 892.
118 Id. at 656, 829 S.E.2d at 893.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 657, 829 S.E.2d at 893.
122 351 Ga. App. 561, 831 S.E.2d 222 (2019).
123 Id. at 566–67, 831 S.E.2d at 228.
124 Id. at 568, 831 S.E.2d at 230.
125 Id. at 569, 831 S.E.2d at 230.
115
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trial court found genuine issues of material fact supporting this claim
and the court of appeals disagreed, stating that for a breach to provide
the basis for an anticipatory repudiation claim, it must be an “unqualified
repudiation of the entire contract prior to the time of performance.” 126
The court of appeals also overturned the trial court’s decision denying
summary judgment on the plaintiff’s negligence claim. 127 Since the
borrowers based their negligence claim on an alleged failure to comply
with Freddie Mac’s servicing guidelines, the court of appeals held that
the guidelines neither imposed a duty on a lender for the benefit of their
borrower, nor provided for a private right of action. 128
Finally, the court of appeals took a close look at O.C.G.A.
§ 9-13-172.1, 129 which permits a foreclosing party to rescind the
foreclosure in specific circumstances. 130 In Najarian Capital, LLC v.
Federal National Mortgage Association, 131 the court of appeals
consolidated two similar cases. In each, the appellant purchased property
at foreclosure and appellee rescinded the sale within thirty days of
foreclosure. Appellant sought documentation proving that the rescission
statute applied. Appellant then filed suit, alleging breach of contract and
seeking specific performance. The trial court granted Fannie Mae’s
motion to dismiss in both cases, and Najarian Capital appealed. 132 The
court of appeals ultimately affirmed, holding that the statute did not
require the foreclosing entity to provide either documentary proof or any
type of reasonable evidence that the rescission qualified under the
statute. 133 While appellant argued that this ruling would effectively
prevent a purchaser from ever challenging a rescission, the court of
appeals disagreed, arguing that the purchaser could have obtained
information proving that the rescission was wrongful from other sources
prior to filing suit. 134 This certainly makes clear for the future that
foreclosure sale purchasers will have a difficult time challenging
rescissions under O.C.G.A. § 9-13-172.1.

Id.
Id. at 574, 831 S.E.2d at 233.
128 Id.
129 O.C.G.A. § 9-13-172.1 (2020).
130 O.C.G.A. § 9-13-172.1(d) (2020).
131 354 Ga. App. 159, 840 S.E.2d 500.
132 Id. at 160, 840 S.E.2d at 501.
133 Id. at 161, 840 S.E.2d at 502.
134 Id. at 163, 840 S.E.2d at 503.
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VI. SALE OF REAL PROPERTY 135
In BCM Construction Group, LLC v. Williams, 136 the Georgia Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of whether a modification to the closing date
on a real estate purchase contract had to be in writing and whether a
questions of fact existed to make dismissal improper. 137 On January 10,
2018, BCM Construction Group, LLC (BCM Construction) and Dianne
and Johnie Williams (collectively the Williamses) entered into an
agreement for BCM to purchase five parcels of land for $4,500,000. The
closing of the purchase was to occur in two phases with the first phase to
close by August 23, 2018. The purchase agreement contained language
that, “if for any reason the closing of the purchase of Phase I has not
occurred within 225 days of the date of this contract, except due to default
by Seller, this contract shall expire and terminate without notice.” 138 The
agreement further stated that there could be no extension to the
agreement “unless agreed upon in writing” by both parties and that “no
modification of this Agreement shall be binding unless signed by all
parties” to the agreement. 139
On the eve of closing, BCM Construction’s principal sent an email to
the Williamses requesting an extension of the closing date. BCM
Construction stated that the extension was sought due to a delay in
obtaining zoning approval and a land disturbance permit. BCM
Construction requested that the closing date be extended to seven days
of receipt of the land disturbance permit. The Williamses did not respond
until the following week and informed BCM Construction’s agent that
they would not require strict compliance with the closing date. On
September 5, 2018, the Williamses notified BCM Construction that it had
terminated the contract due to the failure to close by the closing date in
the agreement. 140
BCM Construction filed a lawsuit against the Williamses asserting
claims for promissory estoppel, breach of contract, injunctive relief,
specific performance, and a declaratory judgment that the failure to close
was caused by the Williamses’ failure to honor an alleged promise to

135 This section was authored by Alexander F. Koskey, III, CIPP/US, CIPP/E, Associate,
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC. Samford University (B.S. 2004);
Cumberland School of Law, Samford University (J.D. 2007). Member, State Bars of
Georgia, Florida, and Alabama; United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
United States District Courts for the Northern District of Georgia, Middle District of
Georgia, and Middle District of Florida.
136 353 Ga. App. 811, 840 S.E.2d 51 (2020).
137 Id. at 811–12, 840 S.E.2d at 53.
138 Id. at 812, 840 S.E.2d at 53.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 812–13, 840 S.E.2d at 53–54.
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extend the closing date. 141 The Williamses filed a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, asserting that any extension of the closing date had to be
in writing pursuant to the Statute of Frauds 142 and the express terms of
the contract. BCM Construction argued that they could not have closed
on the August 23, 2018, the date stated in the contract, due to a delay
caused by the Williamses. 143 BCM Construction further claimed that the
Williamses waived the closing date requirement by their conduct, and
that BCM Construction had partially performed the contract by having
the property rezoned. 144
The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings to the Williamses
on the basis that the agreement could only be modified in writing and the
Williamses had exhibited no actions which would have extended the
closing date. On appeal, BCM Construction argued that the Williamses
conduct waived the closing date and that such waiver is enforceable
despite a lack of a written modification. BCM Construction also argued
that the Williamses were estopped from terminating the agreement
because BCM Construction reasonably relied upon the oral promise to
extend the closing date and that it was error for the trial court to grant
judgment on the pleadings. 145
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment. 146
In its holding, the court of appeals stated that the issue was whether the
Williamses waived strict compliance with the term of the agreement, not
the modification of the agreement. 147 Although the Williamses disputed
that they waived the closing date orally in a phone call with BCM
Construction, the court of appeals cited to the limited record containing
two emails between the parties, including one from the Williamses to
BCM Construction after the closing date, which stated that their
attorney was reviewing the documents. 148 These allegations alone, the
court of appeals held, create a question of fact as to whether the
Williamses waived strict compliance with the terms of the agreement. 149
The court of appeals further held that other terms of the agreement,
including a specific provision that the parties could not orally waive
provisions of the agreement, were indeed waivable. 150 Therefore, the

Id. at 813, 840 S.E.2d at 54.
O.C.G.A. §§ 13-5-30 and 13-5-31 (2020).
143 BCM Construction Group, LLC, 353 Ga. App. at 813, 840 S.E.2d at 54.
144 Id. at 813–14, 840 S.E.2d at 54.
145 Id. at 814, 840 S.E.2d at 54.
146 Id. at 816, 840 S.E.2d at 56.
147 Id. at 814, 840 S.E.2d at 55.
148 Id. at 816, 840 S.E.2d at 56.
149 Id.
150 Id.
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court of appeals concluded that there were factual questions remaining
as to whether the Williamses’ conduct waived strict compliance with the
closing date and the case, and the trial court erred in granting judgment
on the pleadings. 151
In Estate of Fanning v. Estate of Fanning, 152 the court of appeals
addressed the issue of whether a right of first refusal agreement was
enforceable in a dispute between two family estates concerning the
ability to purchase adjacent parcels of land owned by each estate. 153 In
2010, Karen Fanning and Steven Fanning were transferred adjacent
parcels of real estate by their mother. In conjunction with the transfers,
Karen Fanning and Steven Fanning entered into an “Agreement for
Right of First Refusal” which gave either party an option to purchase the
other party’s parcel of land in the event the owner wants to sell the land.
Under the right of first refusal agreement, the selling party was required
to give the non-selling party thirty days to make an offer to purchase the
property. If the non-selling party did not act within thirty days, the
selling party waived his or her right to purchase the property. 154
The Estate of Karen Fanning (Karen’s Estate) filed a lawsuit against
the Estate of Steven E. Fanning and Cynthia Fanning (collectively
Steven’s Estate) seeking a declaratory judgment from the court that the
right of first refusal agreement was unenforceable or, if it was
enforceable, Karen’s Estate satisfied the notice requirement in the
agreement and Steven’s Estate forfeited its rights under the agreement.
Karen’s Estate filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that it
marketed and listed for sale certain parcels of the property; that a
third-party purchaser executed a contract to purchase the property; that
Karen’s Estate sent notice to Steven’s Estate under the right of first
refusal agreement; and Steven’s Estate did not respond to the notice.
Thus, any right to purchase the property had lapsed. In support of its
motion, Karen’s Estate attached a copy of the notice sent to counsel for
Steven’s Estate referencing an offer from the third party purchaser; a
copy of an email from counsel for Steven’s Estate acknowledging receipt
of the notice; two notices sent to Steven’s Estate at two different
addresses; and an advertisement published in a local newspaper.
Steven’s Estate responded that summary judgment was not proper as
Karen’s Estate did not produce any evidence supporting the claim that it
sent the required notice under the agreement. 155 The trial court granted
summary judgment to Karen’s Estate concluding that the right of refusal
Id.
354 Ga. App. 282, 840 S.E.2d 655 (2020).
153 Id.
154 Id. at 283, 840 S.E.2d at 656–57.
155 Id. at 283–84, 840 S.E.2d 657.
151
152

2020]

REAL PROPERTY

273

was enforceable, but there were no genuine issues of material fact
between the parties. 156
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and
held that Karen’s Estate was not entitled to summary judgment. 157
Specifically, the court of appeals held that the exhibits relied upon by
Karen’s estate in its motion for summary judgment were
“unauthenticated documents, not accompanied by sworn affidavits or
other admissible evidence.” 158 Therefore, Karen’s Estate did not present
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which would entitle it
to summary judgment. 159
In Sexton v. Sewell, 160 the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed whether
a seller was entitled to specific performance of a real estate sales
contract. In March 2017, Zachary and Carrie Sexton (the Buyers) offered
to purchase a house for sale by Russell and Linda Sewell (the Sellers).
The contract between the parties called for a two-week due diligence
period where the Buyers could cancel the contract without penalty. The
closing was scheduled for June 22, 2017. 161
On May 13, 2017, after the expiration of the due diligence period, the
Buyers notified Sellers that they were moving to North Carolina, but that
they still planned to close on the property. On May 22, 2017, the Buyers
notified the Sellers that they were unilaterally terminating the contract.
The Sellers refused the attempted termination and informed the Buyers
that they would seek specific performance of the contract if the Buyers
failed to appear at the closing. The Buyers did not appear at the closing
and, as a result, the Sellers filed a lawsuit seeking specific performance
of the contract. The broker for the sale also asserted claims seeking its
sales commission from the contract. 162
The Sellers filed a motion for partial summary judgment and the
Buyers filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. 163 The trial
court denied the Buyers’ motion and granted the Sellers’ motion. 164 On
appeal, the Buyers contended that the trial court erred when it ruled that
the Sellers were entitled to specific performance despite the fact that they
had an adequate remedy at law. 165 The Georgia Court of Appeals stated

Id. at 282, 840 S.E.2d at 656.
Id.
158 Id. at 285, 840 S.E.2d at 658.
159 Id.
160 351 Ga. App. 273, 830 S.E.2d 605 (2019).
161 Id. at 273, 830 S.E.2d at 607.
162 Id. at 274, 830 S.E.2d at 607–08.
163 Id., 830 S.E2d at 608.
164 Id. at 275, 830 S.E.2d at 608.
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that “the threshold question in the instant case is whether the Sellers
met their burden of showing that they did not have an adequate remedy
at law available to them [which] would have compensated them for the
Buyers’ breach of the Contract.” 166
The court of appeals held that the Sellers failed to meet that burden. 167
In its holding, the court of appeals noted multiple reasons why the Sellers
were not entitled to specific performance. 168 First, the Sellers could have
accepted the Buyers’ tender of $40,000 in earnest money when they first
learned that the Buyers wanted to terminate the contract, retained that
money, and remarketed the property to another buyer. 169 Second,
between the time the Buyers notified the Sellers of termination and the
closing date, the Buyers offered the Sellers $80,000 to terminate the
contract. 170 The Sellers did not respond to this offer and, as the court of
appeals noted, there was nothing indicating that the offer would not have
been an adequate remedy of law. 171 Third, the Sellers could have
immediately sued the Buyers for damages and the Sellers’ argument that
monetary damages would never constitute an adequate remedy at law
lacked merit. 172 Finally, the court of appeals noted that the Sellers did
not make any changes to the property to make it “unique” about the
Buyers that would support an order requiring specific performance. 173
Therefore, the court of appeals concluded that the Sellers failed to meet
their burden of showing that they lacked an adequate remedy at law and
reversed the trial court’s granting of summary judgment to the Sellers
for specific performance. 174 The issues have not concluded, however, as
certiorari was granted by the Georgia Supreme Court on February 10,
2020. 175
VI. TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY 176
The analysis of whether Georgia law allows a private organization that
leases its property from a government entity to prohibit visitors from
carrying firearms on its premises continues in GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v.

Id. at 276, 830 S.E.2d at 609.
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170 Id. at 277, 830 S.E.2d at 610.
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172 Id. at 277–78, 830 S.E.2d at 610.
173 Id. at 279–80, 830 S.E.2d at 611.
174 Id. at 281, 830 S.E.2d at 613.
175 Sewell v. Sexton, 2020 Ga. Lexis 114*
176 This section was authored by Linda S. Finley.
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Atlanta Botanical Garden, Inc. (GeorgiaCarry III) 177 The case has an
extended appellate history, having earlier been before the Georgia
Supreme Court 178 and the Georgia Court of Appeals. 179 During the
Survey period, the matter came back before the supreme court to review
the court of appeals’ affirmation of a trial court order holding that
Atlanta Botanical Garden, Inc. (the Garden) could deny entrance to
armed guests. 180
The City of Atlanta (the City) owns the property which it leased to the
Garden. Phillip Evans (Evans), a member of GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc.
(GeorgiaCarry), a gun rights organization, visited the Garden carrying a
handgun in a holster on his waistband. Evans was stopped by an
employee of the Garden and was advised that weapons were prohibited
and he was escorted off the property. 181 Evans and GeorgiaCarry filed
suit seeking interlocutory relief based on O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127(c) 182 and
declaratory judgment that the Garden, as a lessee of the city, was covered
by the statute. 183 The trial court dismissed the suit, and on appeal the
Georgia Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part and
returned the matter to the trial court. 184
On remand, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Garden
on the basis that the Garden’s property was private property and,
therefore, it could prohibit guns. 185 Evans and GeorgiaCarry contended
that since the property was owned by the City of Atlanta, the Gardens
should be considered public for the purposes of the statute. 186 In its
review of the trial court order, the court of appeals found that when the
City conveyed the leasehold interest to the Garden, the Garden’s
leasehold estate "is severed from the fee," and thereafter classified as

306 Ga. 829, 834 S.E.2d 27 (2019).
Georgiacarry.Org, Inc. v. Atlanta Botanical Garden, Inc. (GeorgiaCarry I), 299 Ga.
26, 785 S.E.2d 874 (2016).
179 Georgiacarry.Org, Inc. v. Atlanta Botanical Garden, Inc. (GeorgiaCarry II), 345 Ga.
App. 160, 812 S.E. 527 (2018); see also, Finley, Linda S., Survey of Georgia Real Property
Law, 70 Mercer L. Rev.209, 215 (2018) for further discussion regarding the Court of Appeals
decision.
180 GeorgiaCarry II, 345 Ga. App. at 163–64; 834 S.E.2d at 530.
181 GeorgiaCarry III, 306 Ga. at 831, 834 S.E.2d at 30.
182 O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127(c) (2020). This statute authorizes those with gun licenses to
carry weapons at any location not excluded in the statute. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127(b) (2020)
identifies the prohibited places as government buildings, courthouses, jails and prisons,
places of worship (except where allowed by the governing body of the church), state mental
health facilities, nuclear power plants and polling places.
183 GeorgiaCarry I, 299 Ga. at 26, 785 S.E.2d at 874
184 Id.
185 GeorgiaCarry II, 345 Ga. App. at 160, 812 S.E.2d at 528.
186 Id. at 162, 812 S.E.2d at 529.
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private property so that the Garden could make its decision to ban
firearms. 187
The supreme court narrowed its review of the case to “whether
O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127(c) permits a private organization that leases
property owned by a municipality to prohibit the carrying of firearms on
the leased premises.” 188 The court analyzed whether the Garden property
was public or private. 189 “[P]roperty may be considered ‘private’ only if
the holder of the present estate in the property is a private person or
entity.” 190 Because the City is a public entity, “if it is the holder of the
present estate, then the leased premises is not private property within
the meaning of the statute because property owned by a municipality is
not ‘private property’” and the Garden had no right to exclude firearms
on the leased premises. 191 But, if the terms of the lease with the City
provided that, “the Garden holds the present estate in the property, then
the property is ‘private property,’” and the Garden as a private property
owner can exclude its visitors from carrying firearms on the premises. 192
A lease can create one of two types of rights in the property in favor of
the tenant. If the lease limits tenants use to possess and enjoy the use of
the property, “no estate passes out of the landlord and the tenant has
only a usufruct.” 193 “A usufruct has been referred to as merely a license
in real property, which is defined as authority to do a particular act or
series of acts on land of another without possessing any estate or interest
therein.” 194 A lease which provides a fixed term may also create an estate
for years. “An estate for years is one which is limited in its duration to a
period which is fixed or which may be made fixed and certain.” 195 An
estate for years allows the lessee the right to use the leased property in
any manner lessee chooses as long as the property or the party which is
entitled to the remainder or reversion interest is not injured by such
use. 196 As such, the tenant of an estate for years is treated as the owner
of the property during the life of the estate. 197

Id. (citing Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Coleman, 219 Ga. 12, 16(1), 131 S.E.2d 768 (1963)).
306 Ga. at 829, 834 S.E.2d at 29.
189 Id. at 830, 834 S.E.2d at 29.
190 Id.
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193 O.C.G.A. § 44-7-1 (a) (2019).
194 306 Ga. at 838, 834 S.E.2d at 34; citing Jekyll Dev. Assoc., L.P. v. Glynn County Bd.
of Tax Assessors, 240 Ga. App. 273, 523 S.E.2d 370 (1999).
195 O.C.G.A. § 44-6-100 (2019).
196 O.C.G.A. § 44-6-103 (2019).
197 306 Ga. at 838, 834 S.E.2d at 35.
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A usufruct is not considered an estate in real property under Georgia
law . . . [and] during the term of a usufruct, the landlord continues to
hold the present estate in the property. By contrast, if the lease terms
create an estate for years, the present estate in the property passes
from the landlord/grantor to the tenant/grantee for the duration of the
lease, and the tenant/grantee is treated by our law as the owner of the
property for that period of time. 198

The court’s analysis comes down to one thing: what were the terms of
the lease? Because the lease was not made a part of the record on appeal
and a determination based on the second theory would require a review
of the lease terms, the supreme court held that summary judgment in the
trial court was improper and reversed and remanded the case to the court
of appeals. 199 We will surely see more of this case in the future.
VII. TAXATION OF REAL PROPERTY 200
Valuation of real property for taxing purposes is a repeated hot topic
for taxpayers as tax assessments have a habit of increasing each year. In
Dekalb County Board of Tax Assessors v. CWS Brookhaven, LLC, 201 the
court of appeals consolidated two cases where the Dekalb County Board
of Tax Assessors (the Board) challenged the trial court’s grant of
taxpayers’ motions for summary judgment. 202 Specifically, each of the
matters appealed involved apartment complexes in which the assessed
values were greatly increased from previous years. CWS SGARR
Brookhaven, LLC (CWS) owned an apartment complex consisting of 57
“Class B” units located in “neighborhood 7051” of Dekalb County. In
2016, the value of the property was assessed at $57,903,500. CWS
appealed that assessment to the County Board of Equalization (BOE)
which set the value of that property to $57,903,500. CWS did not appeal
and paid its taxes on the assessed value. In 2017, the Board conducted
an analysis of all the “Class B” apartment complexes that sold in 2016
and determined that it had greatly undervalued the CWS property. As
part of its reevaluation process, the Board retained a commercial
property appraiser to conduct an on-site inspection of the property and
render an opinion of value. The result was that assessed value of the
property increased to $69,753,371. CWS was unsuccessful in its appeal
to the BOE and then appealed that decision to the superior court. 203

Id. at 838–39, 834 S.E.2d at 35.
Id. at 842, 834 S.E.2d at 37.
200 This section was authored by Linda S. Finley.
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Likewise, Aztec owned a “Class B” property known as the Hidden
Colony Apartments, which in 2015 had been assessed a value of
$8,503,560. Similar to CWS, the Aztec property was subjected to an
on-site inspection and appraisal and a reanalysis of the value of the
property. The assessed value was determined to be $22,339,565, a
whopping 166% increase over the 2015 valuation. Aztec appealed to the
BOE which decreased the value to $20,339,480. Aztec also appealed to
the superior court. 204
In each case, the taxpayers moved for summary judgment contending
that the two year freeze to assessment increases, provided by O.C.G.A.
§ 48-5-299(c), 205 precluded the Board from increasing the assessed value
set by a BOE appeal. 206 The BOE argued that the code section permitted
reevaluation because an analysis of similar properties determined that
the properties were significantly undervalued. The trial court granted
the taxpayers’ motions for summary judgment ruling that changes in
comparable sales were not a “material factor” as contemplated by
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-299(c)(4) 207 and therefore could not be used as a stated
basis for increasing the valuations. 208
The Board contended that the trial court erred because “the plain
language of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-299(c)(4) indicates that evidence of
significantly increased sales prices of like properties can, as a matter of
law, constitute a material factor authorizing a reassessment within two
years of a judicial determination of valuation.” 209 That is, because the
statute is clear and the language of the statute does not exclude “market
conditions” as a material factor affecting the fair market value of the
property, there should not be a limitation in the definition of factors. 210
In affirming the trial court in each case, the appellate court stood by
the long-time axiom of statute interpretation to “‘presume that the
[Georgia] General Assembly meant what it said and said what it
meant’” 211 as well as previous interpretations of the purpose O.C.G.A.
§ 48-5-299(c) to “‘limit the circumstances in which a board of tax
assessors could raise the value of real property for the two consecutive
years following an appeal wherein the board of equalization or the

Id. at 850, 836 S.E.2d at 731.
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-299(c) (2020).
206 Dekalb County, 352 Ga. App at 850, 836 S.E.2d at 731.
207 O.C.G.A. § 48-5-299(c)(4)
208 Dekalb County, 352 Ga. App at 850, 836 S.E.2d at 731.
209 Id. at 850–51, 836 S.E.2d at 731.
210 Id.
211 Id.(citing Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013)).
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superior court determined the value of such property.’” 212 Using this
precedent, the court applied the rule of “ejusdem generis,” which
prescribes that
when a statute of exception thereto enumerates by name or description
several particular things and then concludes with a general term of
enlargement—such as “other factors”—the term of enlargement “is to
be construed as being . . . of the same kind of class with things
specifically named unless, of course, there is something to show that a
wider sense was intended.” 213

That is, that absent a showing that the reassessment falls within an
exception set out in O.C.G.A. § 48-5-299, it cannot be increased for the
next two successive years. 214 The court’s analysis led to its application of
rules of statutory interpretations and reading O.C.G.A. § 48-5-299(c)(4)
to determine that the “other material factors” contemplated by the
statute must meet two requirements: (1) the factors must be such that
they could be revealed by an on-site inspection; and (2) the factors much
be specific to the particular piece of property at issue. 215 A change in
market conditions or a rise in property values in a particular
neighborhood is not discernable from an on-site inspection and neither is
such a factor specific to a particular piece of property. 216 Accordingly, the
appellate court held that the factors set out by the county were
insufficient to support its position. 217
The second contention of the Board was that the court’s
interpretations of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-299(c)(4) would force the Board to
violate constitutional and statutory law regarding geographic uniformity
of assessments. 218 The appellate court held that the Board’s arguments
were without merit and that the reassessment procedures of the BOE to
arrive at fair market value of a specific property satisfied the
constitutionally-mandated duty to maintain a uniform tax digest and to
212 Id. (citing Mundell v. Chatham County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 280 Ga. App. 389. 634
S.E.2d 180 (2006)).
213 Id. at 852, 836 S.E.2d at 732 (citing Montgomery County v. Hamilton, 337 Ga. App.
500, 788 S.E.2d 89 (2016)).
214 The exceptions include (failure to attend the appeal hearing or provide the BOE with
written evidence supporting the taxpayer’s opinion of value; (2) filing a return at a different
valuation during the successive two years; (3) filing an appeal pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 48-5-311 (2020) during the two successive tax years; and (4) as relevant to the appeal. Id.
at 852, 836 S.E.2d at 732.
215 Id. at 853, 836 S.E.2d at 732 (citing Center for a Sustainable Coast v. Coastal
Marshlands Protections Comm., 248 Ga. 736, 670 S.E.2d 429 (2008)).
216 Id. at 855, 836 S.E.2d at 733.
217 Id., 836 S.E.2d at 733–34.
218 Id., 836 S.E.2d at 734.

280

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

protect taxpayers from uncertainty within the two years following
appeal. 219
VIII. TRESPASS AND NUISANCE 220
Floyd v. Chapman 221 concerned a dispute over a gravel driveway
constructed by the Floyds over land owned by Chapman. 222 The Floyds
were gifted their land from Mr. Floyd’s stepmother (the stepmother). The
Floyd’s built a house on the land and, although the land contained road
frontage, they avoided constructing a new path to connect their home to
the road by using an old logging road which ran across their property as
well as property retained by the stepmother. The Floyd’s improved the
path and hauled gravel onto it and installed an access gate on the
driveway. The stepmother also granted the Floyds an easement so
utilities could be installed to the Floyd home, but the Floyds did not seek
an easement for their driveway believing they had the legal right to use
the land. 223
In 2014, the stepmother told the Floyds that she intended to sell the
remainder of the property she held, and Mr. Floyd told her that the
driveway crossed her property and asked for an easement. The
stepmother failed to take any action and in 2017 she sold the remainder
of the land to Chapman “subject to all easements for roads and utilities
in use or of record.” 224 After being unable to work out an agreement for
use of the driveway, the Floyds filed suit seeking a private right of way
over Chapman’s property. Chapman counterclaimed for trespass and
sought an injunction to prevent the Floyds from using the driveway for
travel or for the underground utility lines. 225 After a bench trial, the court
found that the Floyds had not established a prescriptive right of way
because they failed to show evidence of use for a period of twenty years.
The court further found that the Floyds had trespassed on Chapman’s
land and ordered the Floyds to remove the access gate and underground
utility lines. 226
In upholding the trial court’s order, the court of appeals reviewed law
concerning prescriptive title and related theories. 227 The key to obtaining
title by prescription is whether there is uninterrupted use for a period of
Id. at 856, 836 S.E.2d at 734.
This section is authored by Linda S. Finley.
221 353 Ga. App. 434, 838 S.E.2d 99 (2020).
222 Id. at 434, 838 S.E.2d at 101–02.
223 Id. at 435, 838 S.E.2d at 102.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 435–36, 838 S.E.2d at 102–03.
226 Id. at 436, 838 S.E.2d at 103.
227 Id.
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seven years through improved land or by twenty years through wild
lands. 228 The trial court found that Chapman’s property consisted of wild
land and not improved land. 229 The Floyds having built their road in 2006
could not show a twenty year period to obtain prescriptive title. 230
The appeals court next examined whether the Floyds had obtained a
private way over Chapman’s land. 231 To establish a private way a party
must show:
(1) that they, or a predecessor in title, had been in uninterrupted use
of the alleged private way for the period of time required by OCGA
§ 44-9-1; (2) that the private way is no more than twenty feet wide, and
that it is the same twenty feet originally appropriated; and (3) that
they have kept the private way in repair during the period of
uninterrupted use . . . . [a] claim of prescriptive title requires proof
that the possession did not originate in fraud and was (1) public; (2)
continuous; (3) exclusive; (4) uninterrupted; (5) peaceable; and (6)
accompanied by a claim of right. The use must also be adverse rather
than permissive. 232

After confirming the trial court’s order to remove the gate was proper
because the Floyds had no prescriptive easement for the driveway and
had therefore trespassed onto Chapman’s land, the court of appeals went
on to review the trial court’s findings concerning the utility lines and
reversed the trial court’s decision on that issue. 233 The easement that the
stepmother granted to the utility company was broad in scope and the
language in the deed to Chapman specifically stated that Chapman took
the land “subject to all easements for roads and utilities in use or of
record.” 234 The court therefore held that a valid easement existed as to
the powerlines and that the lines were not a trespass upon Chapman’s
property and could remain in place. 235
In Rouse v. City of Atlanta, 236 the appellate court analyzed whether
the City of Atlanta (City) committed trespass against a property owner
by virtue of an unknown deeply buried sewer line on the homeowner’s
property and whether the property was “dedicated” to the City. 237

Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 44-9-1 (2020)).
Id. at 437, 838 S.E.2d at 104.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 436–37, 838 S.E.2d at 103.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 439, 838 S.E.2d at 105.
234 Id. at 435, 838 S.E.2d at 102.
235 Id. at 439, 838 S.E.2d at 105.
236 353 Ga. App. 542, 839 S.E.2d 8 (2020).
237 Id. at 542, 839 S.E.2d at 10.
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The facts were that, in 2012, Rouse purchased a home in Atlanta which
was built in 2004. Rouse did not know of the sewer line, which traversed
the property, and there was no instrument of record which showed an
easement for the line, nor was there any outward appearance that a
sewer line existed. In 2017, Rouse contracted to sell the property for
$380,000. During the closing process the sewer line was discovered
between seventeen and thirty feet below the surface of the property. The
sale fell through and the evidence displayed that the existence of the
sewer line lowered the value of the property to $10,000. 238
Rouse filed an action against the City for trespass, nuisance, and
taking and inverse condemnation. He also sought an award of special
damages and attorney’s fees. Rouse filed a motion for summary judgment
in the trial court on the grounds that the City had no recorded easement
to permit the sewage pipe to traverse his property; the facts of the case
did not give rise to a prescriptive easement or dedication; and
alternatively he should be awarded compensation for the taking of his
property. The City also filed its motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that the City had continuously maintained and repaired the pipe
since 1896, therefore the portion of Rouse’s land traversed by the sewage
pipe was impliedly dedicated to the City. 239 The trial court granted the
City’s motion and denied Rouse’s motion. 240
The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in granting the
City’s motion for summary judgment because the evidence was
inadequate to prove that the land in question was dedicated to the City,
stating that “[d]edication is the setting aside of land by the owner for a
public use.” 241 Land can be dedicated for public use either expressly or by
the actions of the owner. 242 After the land is dedicated and used by the
public, the owner cannot afterwards reappropriate the land to his private
use. 243 The City’s burden of proof was to show either express or implied
dedication of the land by Rouse, or Rouse’s acquiescence of its use by the
public. 244
The record showed that the sewage pipe was constructed in the late
1800s and was being actively used by the City as part of its sewer system.
The record was unclear whether the property owner at the time of the
construction constructed the pipe for his own use or gave the City
Id. at 543, 839 S.E.2d at 11.
Id.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 543–44, 839 S.E.2d at 11 (citing Lowry v. Rosenfeld, 213 Ga. 60, 96 S.E.2d 581
(1957)).
242 Id. at 544, 839 S.E.2d at 11
243 Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 44-5-230 (2020)).
244 Id., 839 S.E.2d at 11–12.
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permission to construct it, and there is no recorded easement in the
county land records. The City conceded that it was unknown whether the
1800s property owner constructed the sewer pipe or whether he allowed
the pipe to be constructed on the property. Further, the only evidence to
support the allegations in the City’s claims that it had continuously
maintained and repaired the pipe since 1896 was the record of a single
inspection in 2011. 245 Accordingly, although the City proved that it was
actively using the sewer pipe, the court concluded that the City could not
prove dedication of the property because it could not meet its burden to
show facts that clearly indicated that an owner meant to abandon his
personal dominion over the property and to dedicate it to public use. 246
That is, evidence of a sole inspection during the 100-year plus life of the
sewage pipe was insufficient to prove dedication and the trial court was
reversed. 247
The court of appeals next turned to Rouse’s arguments that the trial
court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment on his claims
for trespass, nuisance, inverse condemnation, and attorney’s fees. 248
Trespass is any wrongful interference with an owner’s right to exclusive
use and the benefit of the property and is a voluntary and intentional act.
Key to this matter is, to maintain an action for trespass, a party must
show either that he is the true owner with legal title or that he was in
possession at the time of the trespass. 249 Here, a question of fact
remained as to whether property had been dedicated to the City’s use. If
so, then there was no trespass. Because a question of fact remained, the
trial court did not err in denying Rouse’s motion on this claim. 250
In examining Rouse’s claim for nuisance, the court of appeals
concluded that a municipality can be liable for nuisance when it, among
other things, maintains a sewer system which damages or
inconveniences the property. 251
To state a claim for nuisance against a municipality, a plaintiff must
establish that (1) the city’s conduct was egregious enough to exceed
mere negligence, (2) the resulting continuous or repetitious dangerous
condition was of some duration, and (3) the city failed to correct the

Id. at 544–45, 839 S.E.2d at 12.
Id. at 545, 839 S.E.2d at 12.
247 Id. at 545–46, 839 S.E.2d at 12–13.
248 Id. at 546, 839 S.E.2d at 12.
249 Id., 839 S.E.2d at 13.
250 Id. at 546–47, 839 S.E.2d at 13.
251 Id. at 547, 839 S.E.2d at 13.
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danger within a reasonable time after acquiring knowledge of the
defect or dangerous condition. 252

Because the City used the sewer pipe for sewage and rainwater,
whether the City owned, constructed, maintained, or installed the pipe
and attempted to repair created a question of fact as to whether the City
exercised dominion and control over the pipe. Therefore, it was proper for
Rouse’s motion for summary judgment to be denied. 253
Next, turning to Rouse’s claim for inverse condemnation, the court
looked at the elements of proof.
An inverse condemnation claim arises when the governmental entity
creates a condition on private property that amounts to a taking
without compensation . . . . [A] property owner does not have to show
a physical invasion of the property, but only an unlawful interference
with the owner’s right to enjoy the land. 254

That is, an inverse condemnation occurs where a municipality takes
some action for public purpose which causes a nuisance or trespass
resulting in the diminished use and functionality of a private owner’s
land. 255 However, even though the City admitted it actively used the
sewer pipe on Rouse’s property, and therefore had taken affirmative
action that caused a nuisance, trespass, or diminished the use of Rouse’s
property, the fact issue of whether the property was dedicated to the City
remained, precluding summary judgment. 256 Finally, the court denied
that Rouse was entitled to attorney’s fees because the questions of fact
identified by the court remained. 257

Id.
Id. at 547–48, 839 S.E.2d at 14.
254 Id. at 548, 839 S.E.2d at 14.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 549, 839 S.E.2d at 15.
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